Summary of the order/judgement
In this case, the Supreme Court’s advisory jurisdiction under Article 143 of the Constitution was invoked by the President of India.
The Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal had passed certain interim orders, inter alia directing the State of Karnataka to release water from its reservoirs, regarding which differences arose. The Karnataka Governor subsequently promulgated the Karnataka Cauvery Basin Irrigation Protection Ordinance, 1991 which was given overriding effect over anything contained in any order, report or decision of any Court or Tribunal (whether made before or after the commencement of this Ordinance), save and except a final decision of the Tribunal under the provisions of Section 5(2)read with Section 6 of the Inter State River Water Disputes Act, 1956.
In light of this, the following issues referred to the Court:
a) The constitutionality of the Ordinance and its provisions.
b) i) Whether the interim order of the Tribunal constitutes a report and a decision within the meaning of Section 5(2) of the 1956 Act?
ii) Whether the interim order of the Tribunal is required to be published by the Central Government in order to make it effective?
c) Whether the Water Disputes Tribunal constituted under the Act is competent to grant any interim relief to the parties to the dispute?
The Supreme Court held that:
a) The entire judicial power of the State and, therefore, of the courts including that of the Supreme Court to adjudicate upon an original dispute or complaint with respect to the use, distribution or control of the water of, or in any inter-State river or river valleys has been vested in the Tribunal appointed under Section 4 of the 1956 Act. The grant of interim relief cannot be said to fall outside the purview of the said provisions and can be agitated under Article 131 of the Constitution. Hence any executive order or a legislative enactment of a State which interferes with the adjudicatory process and adjudication by such Tribunal is an interference with the judicial power of the State. Since the Ordinance sought directly to nullify the order of the Tribunal passed on June 25, 1991 it impinges upon the judicial power of the State and is, therefore, ultra vires the Constitution.
b) With respect to the third question, the Court distinguished between two situations- when no reference for grant of interim relief is made to the Tribunal and when reference for grant of interim relief is made to the tribunal. It was observed that this question had been answered in previous judgments of this Court and this Bench could not sit on appeal on the said decision.
c) With reference to the second question, the Court held that the interim relief request was a matter connected to the dispute, and the order pertaining to it would thus be in the nature of a report and would be required to be published. The interim orders passed or reliefs granted by the Tribunal, when they are not of purely procedural nature and have to be implemented by the parties to make them effective, are deemed to be a report and a decision within the meaning of Sections 5(2) and 6 of the 1956 Act. The interim orders in question were not meant to be merely declaratory in nature but were meant to be implemented and given effect to by the parties. Hence, they constitute a report and a decision within the meaning of Section 5(2) and are required to be published by the Central Government under Section 6 of the Act in order to be binding on the parties and to make it effective.